A Unique Informationally Efficient Allocation Mechanism In Economies With Consumption Externalities
AbstractThis article investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in pure exchange economies with consumption externalities. It is shown that the distributive Lindahl mechanism has a minimal informational size of the message space, and thus it is informationally the most efficient allocation process that is informationally decentralized and realizes Pareto-efficient allocations over the class of economies that include nonmalevolent economies. Furthermore, it is shown that the distributive Lindahl mechanism is the unique informationally efficient decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto-efficient and individually rational allocations over a certain class of nonmalevolent economies. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 45 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Meng, Dawen, 2011.
"Multi-task Incentive Contract and Performance Measurement with Multidimensional Types,"
41152, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 377-404.
- Emanuela Randon & Peter Simmons, 2007.
"Correcting Market Failure Due to Interdependent Preferences: When Is Piecemeal Policy Possible?,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 831-866, October.
- E Randon & P Simmons, . "Correcting Market Failure Due to Interdependent Preferences: When Is Piecemeal Policy Possible?," Discussion Papers 05/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Guoqiang Tian & Liyan Yang, 2009. "Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 399-424, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.