Counting combinatorial choice rules
AbstractI count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymtotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents---which has positive implications for the Gale-Shapley algorithm of matching theory.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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