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Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

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Dagan, Nir
Serrano, Roberto

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-3T51RH8-1F/2/73586fde8040bf8514eac1be08fc4c94
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 58 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 43-49
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:58:y:1998:i:1:p:43-49

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  1. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working papers 322, University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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  5. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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