Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution

Contents:

Author Info

  • Britz, Volker
  • Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
  • Predtetchinski, Arkadi

Abstract

We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4YYXJX2-2/2/8f58e4278571b3cb970276a37d93b95c
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1951-1967

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1951-1967

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords: Nash bargaining solution Subgame perfect equilibrium Stationary strategies Markov process;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Vartiainen, 2010. "Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 677-689, October.
  3. Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-96, September.
  4. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
  5. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  6. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-60, March.
  7. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
  8. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  9. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities," Research Memorandum 044, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  10. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  11. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  12. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  13. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  14. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  15. Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2004. "Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 407-411, September.
  16. Kyle Hyndman & Debraj Ray, 2007. "Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 1125-1147.
  17. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  18. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gaël Giraud & Cécile Renouard, 2011. "In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization," Post-Print hal-00609153, HAL.
  2. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program," Economics Series 2012_9, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  3. Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2009. "On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. Volker Britz & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2014. "Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 14/196, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  5. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2014. "On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 178-183.
  6. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2011. "One-dimensional bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 526-543, June.
  7. Thorsten Upmann & Julia M�ller, 2013. "The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-080/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00611712 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 45-75, September.
  10. Giraud, Gaël & Renouard, Cécile, 2011. "In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization," ESSEC Working Papers WP1108, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  11. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00611712 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Masanori Mitsutsune & Takanori Adachi, 2011. "Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison," KIER Working Papers 799, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Gaël Giraud & Cécile Renouard, 2011. "In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11038, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1951-1967. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.