Equilibrium in the Jungle
AbstractIn the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 522 (07)
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