AbstractThis article is a brief survey on the Nash program for coalitional games. Results of noncooperative implementation of the Nash solution, the Shapley value and the core are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2007-05.
Date of creation: 28 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, London: McMillan
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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