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Nash program

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  • Roberto Serrano

    ()
    (Brown University and IMDEA Social Sciences)

Abstract

This article is a brief survey on the Nash program for coalitional games. Results of noncooperative implementation of the Nash solution, the Shapley value and the core are discussed.

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File URL: http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2007-05.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2007-05.

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Date of creation: 28 Feb 2007
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Publication status: Published in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, London: McMillan
Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-05

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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  2. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April.
  3. Perez-Castrillo J. David, 1994. "Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 428-440, November.
  4. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
  5. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  6. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  8. Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1998. "Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 87-108, August.
  9. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
  10. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  11. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  2. John Duggan, 2011. "Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria," Wallis Working Papers WP62, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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