Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game
AbstractThis paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory ï¿½subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two fundamental ideas: (1) Given an extensive game, the formationof a coalition leads to a new game where all the members of the coalition become one player. (2)At the origin of any subgame, the only possible coalitions consist of players who have decision nodes in the subgame. We introduce a concept of subgame perfect cooperative equilibrium, which we label the gamma-core of an extensive game. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the gamma-core of an extensive game of perfect information. As a motivating example, we formulate the problem of global warming as a dynamic game with simultaneous moves and show that if the payoff functions are quadratic, then the gamma-core of the game is nonempty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 1008.
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html
subgame perfect cooperation; extensive form game; subgame perfection; gamma-core;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SEA-2010-11-20 (South East Asia)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.