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The Recursive Core

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  • Becker, Robert A
  • Chakrabarti, Subir K

Abstract

An allocation in an infinite horizon capital accumulation model is a recursive core allocation provided no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time given its accumulation of assets up to that period. The authors show for every allocation of consumption in the initial core, one can find a distribution of capital stocks among the agents where no coalition of agents will break the initial core contract at any date. The recursive core links the distribution of capital, the problem of trust in the sense of D. Gale, and time consistent intertemporal contracts. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 401-23

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:2:p:401-23

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Cited by:
  1. repec:dgr:umamet:2001013 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
  3. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  5. Laszlo A Koczy, 2000. "The Core of a Partition Function Game," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0025, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  6. Damiano, Ettore & Lam, Ricky, 2005. "Stability in dynamic matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 34-53, July.
  7. Edward C. Prescott & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2000. "On the equilibrium concept for overlapping generations organizations," Working Papers 602, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
  9. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.

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