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Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games

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Author Info
Hellman, Ziv
Abstract

This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative games in each time period. Two alternative definitions of what a ‘sequence of coalitions’ means in such a context are considered, in respect to which the concept of a dynamic game bargaining set may be defined, and existence and non-existence results are studied. A solution concept we term ‘subgame-stable bargaining set sequences’ is also defined, and sufficient conditions are given for the non-emptiness of subgame-stable solutions in the case of a finite number of time periods.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8798/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8798.

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Date of creation: 17 Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8798

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperative game Repeated game Bargaining set

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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  1. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Herings & Hans Peters, 2004. "The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 147-162, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
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  4. Berden Caroline, 2007. "The Role of Individual Intertemporal Transfers in Dynamic TU-Games," Research Memoranda 030, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Kranich,Laurence & Peree,Andrea & Peters,Hans, 2001. "Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games," Research Memoranda 013, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  7. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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