Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The strong sequential core for two-period economies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Predtetchinski, Arkadi
  • Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
  • Peters, Hans

Abstract

The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocations that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the core of the economy where executed asset contracts serve as initial endowments. The strong sequential core coincides with the classical core when all possible state-contingent contracts may serve as an asset. For finance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is generically empty when there is an incomplete set of assets. Outside the setting of finance economies, we show that the strong sequential core can be empty even if there is a complete set of assets. If the set of constrained feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is enlarged to include also allocations outside the agents'' consumption sets, then a complete set of assets is sufficient for the equivalence of the resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBY-47733G7-2/2/6366714bb05507a37b14f57a1d29b9d6
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 465-482

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:4:p:465-482

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. DEBREU, Gérard, . "Smooth preferences," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -132, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
  4. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
  5. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  6. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 563-584.
  7. Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 447-58, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Habis Helga & Herings P. Jean-Jacques, 2009. "Cooperation Under Incomplete Contracting," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
  4. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát?
    [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
  5. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
  6. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp523, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  8. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  9. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:4:p:465-482. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.