The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy
AbstractDynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered where the information is released over infinite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption streams that can be improved upon by no coalition at no moment of time. Non-emptiness of the strong sequential core is established given a high enough discount factor. Moreover, sufficient conditions are given under which the strong sequential core contains only time and history independent consumption streams. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (07)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Predtetchinski,Arkadi & Herings,Jean-Jacques & Peters,Hans, 2002. "The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Hans Peters, 2002. "The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy," Game Theory and Information 0205004, EconWPA.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
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- Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
- Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
- Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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