Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games
AbstractThis paper is concerned with the question of extending the definition of the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a repeated setting. The focus is on situations in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative games in each time period. Two alternative definitions of what a `sequence of coalitions' means in such a context are considered, in respect to which the concept of a repeated game bargaining set may be defined, and existence and non-existence results are studied. A solution concept we term subgame-perfect bargaining set sequences is also defined, and sufficient conditions are given for the nonemptiness of subgame-perfect solutions in the case of a finite number of time periods.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp523.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
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