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The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies

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Author Info

  • Predtetchinski A.

    (Universiteit Maastricht)

  • Herings P.J.J.

    (Universiteit Maastricht)

  • Perea A.

    (Universiteit Maastricht)

Abstract

We adapt the core concept to deal with economies in which trade in assets takes place at period 1, uncertainty about asset payoffs is released at period 2, and agents trade in commodities afterwards. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any coalition once the uncertainty is being released. We restrict ourselves to credible deviations, i.e. coalitional deviations at period 1 that cannot be counterblocked by some subcoalition at period 2. We study the relationship of the resulting core concept with other sequential core concepts, give sufficient conditions under which the weak sequential core is non-empty, but show that it is possible to give reasonable examples where it is empty.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0203/0203008.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0203008.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 25 Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203008

Note: Type of Document - pdf.format; pages: 30 ; figures: included
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Core assets;

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  1. Becker, Robert A & Chakrabarti, Subir K, 1995. "The Recursive Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 401-23, March.
  2. P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, EconWPA.
  3. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
  4. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
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Cited by:
  1. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2012. "Stochastic Bankruptcy Games," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1205, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  2. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
  3. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010. "A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
  4. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  5. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  6. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
  7. P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, EconWPA.
  8. Habis Helga & Herings P. Jean-Jacques, 2010. "Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  9. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Habis Helga & Herings P. Jean-Jacques, 2009. "Cooperation Under Incomplete Contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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