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The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies

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  • P.J.J. Herings

    (University of Maastricht)

  • H. Peeters

Abstract

The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocatioans that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the endowments. The strong sequential core coincides with the classical core when all possible state-contigent contracts may serve as an asset. For finance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is generically empty when there is an incomplete set of assets. Outside the setting of finance economies, we show that the strong sequential core can be empty even if there is an complete set of assets. If the set of constrained feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is enlarged to include also allocations outside the agents'comsumption sets, then a complete set of assets is sufficient for the equivalence of the resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/mic/papers/0111/0111002.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0111002.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 12 Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0111002

Note: Type of Document - pdf.format; pages: 24
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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  1. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 563-584.
  2. DEBREU, Gérard, . "Smooth preferences," CORE Discussion Papers RP -132, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  4. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
  5. Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 447-58, July.
  6. Predtetchinski A. & Herings P.J.J. & Perea A., 2002. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Game Theory and Information 0203008, EconWPA.
  7. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
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Cited by:
  1. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
  2. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  3. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
  4. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Habis Helga & Herings P. Jean-Jacques, 2009. "Cooperation Under Incomplete Contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
  8. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.

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