The simplest and most common interpretation of a coalitional form game is that it pertains to a single interaction among the players. However, many if not most cooperative endeavors occur more than once or even repeatedly over time. In this paper we begin a systematic study of dynamic cooperative games. We argue that new tools are necessary to capture several important features of a dynamic analysis that are not adequately represented within the conventional (static) framework. These include the immutability of the sequence of play, the intertemporal evaluation of payoffs, intertemporal trading and/or borrowing or saving, and history dependent games and/or solutions. Here, we focus on the case in which a given set of players play a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. We extend the notion of a cooperative solution to the intertemporal setting, and we discuss intertemporal extensions of the core and the Shapley value. We also discuss the role of intertemporal trade and borrowing/saving. The paper concludes with a blueprint for future work.
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Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
00-06.
Length: Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:00-06
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Phone: (518) 442-4735 Fax: (518) 442-4736
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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