The Core of a Partition Function Game
AbstractWe consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0012004.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2001
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on A4; pages: 9; figures: none. A PDF file of 9 pages.
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core; partition function; externalities;
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-02-27 (All new papers)
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