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The Core of a Partition Function Game

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Author Info
László Á. Kóczy (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

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Abstract

We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0012/0012004.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0012004.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0012004

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on A4; pages: 9; figures: none. A PDF file of 9 pages.
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: core; partition function; externalities;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. MORELLI, Massimo & PENELLE, Philippe, 1997. "Economic integration as a partition function game," CORE Discussion Papers 1997085, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 1999. "The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 157-171. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Massimo Morelli & Philippe Penelle, 1997. "Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game," Working Papers 9702, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  6. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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