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Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game

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  • Massimo Morelli
  • Philippe Penelle

Abstract

We analyze the problem of economic integration using a cooperative approach. By explicitly introducing time as an endogenous variable, we make sharp predictions about the timing of admission to coalitions, about the equilibrium coalition structure, about the equilibrium payoff distribution, as well as about the equilibrium length of the admission game. We derive conditions under which a union chooses different paths of admission in order to reach the optimal size; we show that the observed sequencing of admissions to the European Union is not consistent with the existence of perfectly competitive markets to price the admission of candidate countries. Welfare implications are derived.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago in its series Working Papers with number 9702.

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Date of creation: Feb 1997
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Handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:9602

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Related research

Keywords: European Union; economic integration; admission; coalition; coalition structure;

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Cited by:
  1. László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information 0111002, EconWPA.
  2. Kóczy,László Á., 2005. "Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements," Research Memorandum 043, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Laszlo A Koczy, 2000. "The Core of a Partition Function Game," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0025, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.

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