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Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach

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Author Info

  • László Á. Kóczy

    (Katholieke Unversiteit Leuven)

Abstract

In this paper we define and solve the accession game, a dynamic game containing a union and a set of applicants with a per-member partition function satisfying the conditions of Yi [17] to include negative externalities. The solution gives an equilibrium partition of the players as well as, after Morelli and Penelle [12], the optimal path, a subgame-perfect sequence of partitions, where each player maximises the present value of its payo.s subject to others’ moves. While this game can be applied in general our motivation was to model the ongoing extensions of the European Union.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0111/0111002.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0111002.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 21 Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0111002

Note: Type of Document - AMS-LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 15; figures: none
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: partition function; externalities; path dependence;

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  1. repec:fth:louvco:9785 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  3. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  4. Massimo Morelli & Philippe Penelle, 1997. "Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game," Working Papers 9702, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  5. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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