Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach
AbstractIn this paper we define and solve the accession game, a dynamic game containing a union and a set of applicants with a per-member partition function satisfying the conditions of Yi  to include negative externalities. The solution gives an equilibrium partition of the players as well as, after Morelli and Penelle , the optimal path, a subgame-perfect sequence of partitions, where each player maximises the present value of its payo.s subject to others’ moves. While this game can be applied in general our motivation was to model the ongoing extensions of the European Union.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0111002.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 21 Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - AMS-LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 15; figures: none
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partition function; externalities; path dependence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENT-2001-11-27 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-GTH-2001-12-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2001-11-27 (Network Economics)
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- repec:fth:louvco:9785 is not listed on IDEAS
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"Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game,"
9702, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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