The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks

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The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks

Author Info

Laszlo.A.Koczy () (Maastricht University, Department of Economics)

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László Á. Kóczy

Abstract

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0512.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0512

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Article
- Koczy, Laszlo A., 2006. "The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 56-64, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Kóczy,László Á., 2005. "The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks," Research Memoranda 042, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Green, Jerry R, 1974. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2004. "The coalition structure core is accessible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 86-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0219, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Game Theory and Information 0110001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2003. "On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 495-526, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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