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Games in coalitional form

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

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  • Weber, Robert J.

Abstract

This chapter has had two principal purposes. One was to develop the idea of the "coalitional function" of a cooperative game as a means of abstracting from given settings (pure exchange economies, strategic-form games, political games, and the like) the possibilities available to the various coalitions through player cooperation. The other was to present several classes of games (market games, simple games, convex games, symmetric games) on which attention will be focused in subsequent chapters, and to provide several tools (covers and extensions, contractions and reductions, and the like) which will be useful in further analysis.

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This chapter was published in:

  • R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 1994. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2, 00.
    This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 2-36.

    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:2-36

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    Cited by:
    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 348-366, February.
    2. BLOCH, Francis & ROTTIER, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda control in coalition formation," CORE Discussion Papers 1999067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. H. Reiju Mihara, 2003. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Game Theory and Information 0310006, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004.
    4. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2006. "Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities," MPRA Paper 440, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ehud Lehrer, 2005. "A new integral for capacities," Game Theory and Information 0504004, EconWPA.
    6. Evan Shellshear, 2009. "Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games," Working Papers 410, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    7. Masahiro Kumabe & H. Reiju Mihara, 2008. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 621-640, December.

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