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From Foraging to Agriculture

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Author Info
Nicolas Marceau () (Center for Research on Economic Fluctuations and Employment, UQAM)
Gordon M. Myers () (Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University)

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Abstract

We consider a world in which the mode of food production, foraging or agriculture, is endogenous, and in which technology grows exogenously. Using a recent model of coalition formation, we allow individuals to rationally form cooperative communities (bands) of foragers or farmers. At the lowest levels of technology, equilibrium entails the grand coalition of foragers, a cooperative structure which avoids over-exploitation of the environment. But at a critical state of technology, the cooperative structure breaks down through an individually rational splintering of the band. At this stage, there can be an increase in work and through the over-exploitation of the environment, a food crisis. In the end, technological growth leads to a one-way transition from foraging to agriculture.

Nous étudions un monde dans lequel le choix du mode de production --- chasse et cueillette ou agriculture --- est endogène et dans lequel il y a progrès technologique exogène. Nous utilisons un modèle de formation des coalitions développé récemment. Dans ce cadre, les individus peuvent former des communautés (ou bandes) de chasseurs/cueilleurs ou de fermiers dans lesquelles ils coopèrent. Lorsque la technologie est peu avancée, une grande bande de chasseurs/cueilleurs se forme à l'équilibre, ce qui assure que l'environnement n'est pas sur-exploité. Mais à un niveau technologique plus avancé, cette structure coopérative se brise parce qu'il devient rentable pour certains individus de produire seul. Il est alors possible que tous travaillent plus et que malgré tout, une crise alimentaire survienne due à la sur-exploitation de l'environnement. Éventuellement, le progrès technologique conduit à une transition de la chasse et la cueillette à l'agriculture.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 103.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:103

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Related research
Keywords: Foraging; Agriculture; Transition; Coalition Formation; Cooperation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
N5 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Smith, Vernon L, 1975. "The Primitive Hunter Culture, Pleistocene Extinction, and the Rise of Agriculture," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 727-55, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brander, James A & Taylor, M Scott, 1998. "The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo-Malthus Model of Renewable Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 119-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Burbidge, John B. & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Meyers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1997. "A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 940-56, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 338., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthew J. Baker, 2005. "Technological Progress, Population Growth, Property Rights, and the Transition to Agriculture," Departmental Working Papers 9, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. A. Muthoo, 2002. "A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights," Economics Discussion Papers 546, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Nils-Petter Lagerlof, 2002. "The Roads To and From Serfdom," Macroeconomics 0212011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Nicolas Marceau & Gordon Myers, 2005. "On the Early Holocene: Foraging to Early Agriculture," Cahiers de recherche 0502, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Abdalla Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2001. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 138, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Arthur J. Robson, 2007. "A "Bioeconomic" View of the Neolithic and Recent Demographic Transitions," Discussion Papers dp07-02, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
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