Incentives and Stability Of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment
AbstractThis paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and 'potential stability' of a number of coalitions which are 'potentially effective' in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 'potentially stable' even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8821.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2013. "Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 44-56.
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2011. "Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment," Working Papers 2011.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2012-03-28 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-03-28 (Environmental Economics)
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