Climate policies: a burden or a gain?
AbstractThat climate policies are costly is evident and therefore often creates major fears. But the alernative (no action) also has a cost. Mitigation costs and damages incurred depend on what the climate policies are, and in addition, they are substitutes. This brings climate policies naturally in the realm of benefit-cost analysis. In this paper we illustrate the "direct" cost components of various policies, and then confront them with the benefits generated, that is, the damage cost avoided. However, the sheer benefit-cost criterion is not a sufficient incentive to induce cooperation among countries, a necessary condition for an effective global climate policy. Thus, we also explore how to make use of this criterion in the context of international climate cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2013002.
Date of creation: 22 Feb 2013
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climate policy; integrated assessment; cost-benefit analysis; climate coalitions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2013-06-04 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2013-06-04 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-06-04 (Environmental Economics)
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