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The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

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Author Info
Thierry, BRECHET (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
Francois, GERARD (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
Henry, TULKENS (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
Jean-Pascal, VAN YPERSELE

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. Ther EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitement. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2008038.

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Length: 30
Date of creation: 04 Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008038

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Related research
Keywords: Climate change; Coalition theory; Integrated assessment model; Kyoto protocol;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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