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The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

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Author Info

  • Thierry, BRECHET

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • Francois, GERARD

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • Henry, TULKENS

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • Jean-Pascal, VAN YPERSELE

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. Ther EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitement. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2008038.

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Length: 30
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008038

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Keywords: Climate change; Coalition theory; Integrated assessment model; Kyoto protocol;

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Cited by:
  1. BRECHET, Thierry & THENIE, Julien & ZEIMES, Thibaut & ZUBER, Stéphane, . "The benefits of cooperation under uncertainty: the case of climate change," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2435, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Duscha, Vicki & Schleich, Joachim, 2012. "Can no-lose targets contribute to a 2 °C target?," Working Papers "Sustainability and Innovation" S9/2012, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI).
  3. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers 2013.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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