The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2008061.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2008
Date of revision:
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climate change; coalition theory; integrated assessment model; Kyoto protocol.;
Other versions of this item:
- Bréchet, Thierry & Eyckmans, Johan & Gerard, François & Marbaix, Philippe & Tulkens, Henry & van Ypersele, Jean-Pascal, 2008. "The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements," Working Papers 2008/43, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
- Thierry, BRECHET & Francois, GERARD & Henry, TULKENS & Jean-Pascal, VAN YPERSELE, 2008. "The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2008038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2009-04-05 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-04-05 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-04-05 (Game Theory)
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- Gregor Schwerhoff, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers 2013.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- BRECHET, Thierry & THENIE, Julien & ZEIMES, Thibaut & ZUBER, Stéphane, 2010.
"The benefits of cooperation under uncertainty: the case of climate change,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2010062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- BRECHET, Thierry & THENIE, Julien & ZEIMES, Thibaut & ZUBER, Stéphane, . "The benefits of cooperation under uncertainty: the case of climate change," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2435, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Duscha, Vicki & Schleich, Joachim, 2012. "Can no-lose targets contribute to a 2 °C target?," Working Papers "Sustainability and Innovation" S9/2012, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI).
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