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The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

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Author Info
BRECHET, Thierry (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
EYCKMANS, Johan (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
GERARD, Franois (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
MARBAIX, Philippe
Abstract

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2008061.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2008061

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Related research
Keywords: climate change; coalition theory; integrated assessment model; Kyoto protocol.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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