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The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

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  • Lessmann, Kai
  • Marschinski, Robert
  • Edenhofer, Ottmar

Abstract

The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi, T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92-97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Modelling.

Volume (Year): 26 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 641-649

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:26:y:2009:i:3:p:641-649

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411

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Keywords: Climate change Self-enforcing international environmental agreements Trade sanctions Coalition stability International cooperation;

References

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  1. Leimbach, Marian & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2007. "Technological spillovers within multi-region models: Intertemporal optimization beyond the Negishi approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 272-294, March.
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  4. EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, . "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1677, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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  16. Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, 2007. "Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission trading," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 137-164, October.
  17. Edenhofer, Ottmar & Bauer, Nico & Kriegler, Elmar, 2005. "The impact of technological change on climate protection and welfare: Insights from the model MIND," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 277-292, August.
  18. Ottmar Edenhofer, Kai Lessmann, Claudia Kemfert, Michael Grubb and Jonathan Kohler , 2006. "Induced Technological Change: Exploring its Implications for the Economics of Atmospheric Stabilization: Synthesis Report from the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 57-108.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Zhang, Zhong Xiang, 2012. "Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 6(3), pages 225-287, December.
  2. Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2014. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models," Working Papers 2014.05, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Schenker, Oliver & Bucher, Raphael, 2010. "On interactions of optimal climate policy and international trade. An assessment of border carbon measures," MPRA Paper 25820, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Leimbach, Marian & Baumstark, Lavinia, 2010. "The impact of capital trade and technological spillovers on climate policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2341-2355, October.
  5. Qin Bao & Ling Tang & ZhongXiang Zhang & Han Qiao & Shouyang Wang, 2011. "Impacts of Border Carbon Adjustments on China’s Sectoral Emissions: Simulations with a Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model," Working Papers 2011.93, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Matthias Weitzel & Michael Hübler & Sonja Peterson, 2012. "Fair, Optimal or Detrimental? Environmental vs. Strategic Use of Border Carbon Adjustment," Kiel Working Papers 1792, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  7. Michael Hübler & Michael Finus, 2013. "Is the risk of North–South technology transfer failure an obstacle to a cooperative climate change agreement?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 461-479, November.
  8. Lessmann, Kai & Marschinski, Robert & Finus, Michael & Kornek, Ulrike & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2012. "Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement : An Analysis of Coalition Stability," Department of Economics Working Papers 32512, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  9. Ottmar Edenhofer & Christian Flachsland, 2012. "Die Nutzung globaler Gemeinschaftsgüter: Politökonomische Herausforderungen an die Klimapolitik," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(12), pages 29-35, 06.

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