Cores of games with positive externalities
AbstractThis paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic game. For a certain class of strategic games, it is a weaker concept than the strong Nash equilibrium, but in general stronger than the conventional α- and β- cores. We argue that the coalition formation process is an infinitely repeated game and show that the grand coalition forms if the γ-core is nonempty. This is a weaker sufficient condition than the previous such condition (Maskin (2003, Theorem 4)). As an application of this result, it is shown that the γ- core of an oligopolistic market is nonempty and thus the grand coalition forms.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2010004.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
positive externalities; strategic game; core; repeated game; coalition formation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2010-06-11 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SEA-2010-06-11 (South East Asia)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pham Do, Kim Hang & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation," MPRA Paper 37408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.