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Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus

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  • Serrano, Roberto

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 319-329

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:319-329

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," CEP Discussion Papers dp0093, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  2. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  3. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992. "Bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August.
  4. Serrano, Roberto, 1993. "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 345-57.
  5. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan 001, Nir Dagan.
  6. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
  7. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  8. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Salant, David J, 2007. "Formulas for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty determination," MPRA Paper 8569, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 2007. "Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(7-8), pages 855-870, September.
  3. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  4. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  5. Albizuri, M. Josune & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 2007. "The dual serial cost-sharing rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 150-163, March.
  6. M. Hinojosa & A. Mármol & F. Sánchez, 2012. "A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 661-678, October.
  7. Ignacio García-Jurado & Julio González-Díaz & Antonio Villar, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 189-197, September.
  8. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  9. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Andreas Tutic & Stefan Pfau & André Casajus, 2011. "Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 529-546, April.
  11. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997. "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan 005, Nir Dagan.
  12. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  13. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.

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