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Stability and Collective Rationality

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  • Lensberg, Terje

Abstract

A collective choice problem involves a set of agents and a set of feasi ble utility vectors. Many solutions to the collective choice problem (e.g., the Nash solution) are collectively rational, i.e., consistent with the maximization of some ordering of utility space. In this pap er, a stability condition due to J. C. Harsanyi is used to obtain the following integrability result: any solution satisfying Pareto optim ality, continuity, and bilateral stability can be represented by an a dditively separable Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 935-61

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:4:p:935-61

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Cited by:
  1. Chun, Youngsub, 2002. "The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 25-43, July.
  2. Stovall, John, 2013. "Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1012, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Sanchez, M. Carmen, 2000. "Rationality of bargaining solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 389-399, May.
  4. Justin Leroux, 2006. "A discussion of the consistency axiom in cost-allocation problems," Cahiers de recherche 06-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  5. Youngsub Chun, 2001. "The Separability Principle in Bargaining," Working Paper Series no43, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  6. Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2006. "Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 637-652, September.
  7. Ok, Efe A., 1998. "Inequality averse collective choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 301-321, October.
  8. Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
  9. Thomson, W., 1998. "Consistency and its Converse: an Introduction," RCER Working Papers 448, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Nir Dagan, 2008. "An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy," Economic theory and game theory 020, Nir Dagan.
  11. Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2012. "Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 185-197.
  12. Stovall, John, 2014. "Collective Rationality and Monotone Path Division Rules," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1035, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  13. Kaminski, Marek M., 2000. "'Hydraulic' rationing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 131-155, September.
  14. Echenique, Federico & Chambers, Christopher P., 2014. "On the consistency of data with bargaining theories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  15. Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 1998. "Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 286-307, December.
  16. Walter Bossert & David Donaldson & Charles Blackorby, 1999. "Rationalizable solutions to pure population problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 395-407.
  17. Szwagrzak, Karol, 2014. "Strategy-proof market clearing mechanisms," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 4/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.

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