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A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule

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Abstract

Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 219-245) proved that the uniform rule of fair division problem, where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity, even in a setting of a finite number of potential agents. A similar result is obtained by replacing envy-freeness with individual rationality from equal division.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 003.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory 69:255-261 (1996)
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:003

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Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

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Cited by:
  1. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massé & Alejandro Neme, 2010. "The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation," Working Papers 437, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism," Economics Working Papers 141, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2013. "The Division Problem under Constraints," Working Papers 745, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  5. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martínez, 2011. "Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 453-467, December.
  6. Lahiri Somdeb, . "Axiomatic Characterizations of the CEA Solution for Rationing Problems," IIMA Working Papers WP1999-02-03, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
  7. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
  8. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2012. "The division problem with maximal capacity constraints," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 29-57, March.
  9. Toyotaka Sakai & Takuma Wakayama, 2012. "Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 287-301, March.
  10. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  11. Kesten, Onur, 2006. "More on the uniform rule: Characterizations without Pareto optimality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 192-200, March.

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