Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 219-245) proved that the uniform rule of fair division problem, where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity, even in a setting of a finite number of potential agents. A similar result is obtained by replacing envy-freeness with individual rationality from equal division.
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Length: 7 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory 69:255-261 (1996) Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:003
Contact details of provider: Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Business, the College of Judea and Samaria, Ariel, Israel. Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nir Dagan).
Find related papers by JEL classification: D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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