This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Moulin, Herve

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGDDC-166/2/3fc80ecd150fb54f49bcfb8627a0f3bd
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 120-148
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:36:y:1985:i:1:p:120-148

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Yu-Hsien Liao, 2008. "The Maximal Equal Allocation of Nonseparable Costs on Multi-Choice Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(70), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yu-Hsien Liao, 2008. "Consistency and the core for fuzzy non-transferable-utility games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(45), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  3. Yan-An Hwang, 2009. "An NTU value under complement reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 305-324, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2001. "Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  5. Bhaskar Dutta & Lars Ehlers & Anirban Kar, 2008. "Externalities, Potential, Value And Consistency," Working papers 168, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Salvador Barbera, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Discussion Papers 1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2009. "Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-16, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.