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Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

Author

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  • Lars Ehlers
  • Bettina Klaus

Abstract

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single‐peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and “solidarity” (population‐monotonicity or replacement‐domination) must equal a so‐called target rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-184, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:167-184
    DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00060
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
    2. Sidartha Gordon, 2007. "Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 125-147, July.
    3. Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.
    4. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 405-430, October.
    5. Juan D Moreno-Ternero & John E Roemer, 2006. "Impartiality, Priority, and Solidarity in the Theory of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1419-1427, September.
    6. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.
    7. Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
    8. Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," SciencePo Working papers hal-01061994, HAL.
    9. Lars Ehlers, 2022. "Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 367-384, September.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February.
    12. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
    13. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01061994, HAL.
    15. Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 2: A Characterization with Solidarity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477B, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2005.

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