Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
AbstractWe consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning K indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-envy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-27.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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PROBABILITY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; PREFERENCES;
Other versions of this item:
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
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- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2000. "Indifference and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 303-308, June.
- Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2001. "Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods," Working Papers 2000-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Crès, Herv� & Moulin, Herv�, 1998. "Random Priority: A Probabilistic Resolution of the Tragedy of the Commons," Working Papers 98-06, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September.
- Hervé Moulin, 2002. "The proportional random allocation of indivisible units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 381-413.
- Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
- Moulin, Herve, 2000. "The Proportional Random Allocation of Indivisible Units," Working Papers 2000-02, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
- Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-84.
- Wataru Kureishi & Hideki Mizukami, 2005. "A Characterization of the Randomized Uniform Rule," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-20, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2010. "The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumont's characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 952-964, November.
- Wataru KUREISHI & Hideki MIZUKAMI, 2007. "Equal probability for the best and the assignment of identical indivisible objects," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(8), pages 1-10.
- Bochet, Olivier & İlkılıç, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé, 2013. "Egalitarianism under earmark constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 535-562.
- Yoichi Kasajima, 2013. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 203-215, June.
- Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 423-447, September.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:8:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bochet, Olivier & Ilkilic, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé & Sethuraman, Jay, 2012. "Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
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