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Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules

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Author Info
Ehlers, L.
Klaus, B.

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Abstract

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning K indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-envy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-27.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-27

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Related research
Keywords: PROBABILITY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; PREFERENCES;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - General

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ehlers, Lars, 2000. "Indifference and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 303-308, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hervé Moulin, 2002. "The proportional random allocation of indivisible units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 381-413. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  5. Crès, Hervé & Moulin, Hervé, 1998. "Random Priority: A Probabilistic Resolution of the Tragedy of the Commons," Working Papers 98-06, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2001. "Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods," Working Papers 2000-09, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-84. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wataru KUREISHI & Hideki MIZUKAMI, 2007. "Equal probability for the best and the assignment of identical indivisible objects," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(8), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 423-447, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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