Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
AbstractWe consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects - to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001.
"Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules,"
Cahiers de recherche
2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
- Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- repec:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20045 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bossert W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013.
030, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
- repec:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043 is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.