Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
AbstractWe consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects - to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000
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- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003.
"Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20036, Maastricht University.
- Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Solidarity and probabilistic target rules,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20045, Maastricht University.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043, Maastricht University.
- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2013.
Cahiers de recherche
04-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
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