Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
AbstractWe consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
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