Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
AbstractWe consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-27.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
obabilistic rules; single-aked eferences; strategy-oofness; uniform allocations;
Other versions of this item:
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20036, Maastricht University.
- Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Solidarity and probabilistic target rules,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20045, Maastricht University.
- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002.
"Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12239, Maastricht University.
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Social Choice and Welfare,
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- Bochet, Olivier & Ilkilic, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé & Sethuraman, Jay, 2012. "Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Wataru Kureishi & Hideki Mizukami, 2005. "A Characterization of the Randomized Uniform Rule," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-20, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:8:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2010. "The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumont's characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 952-964, November.
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