Truth, justice, and cake cutting
AbstractCake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on fairness and consider a strikingly weak notion of truthfulness. In this paper we investigate the problem of cutting a cake in a way that is truthful, Pareto-efficient, and fair, where for the first time our notion of dominant strategy truthfulness is the ubiquitous one in social choice and computer science. We design both deterministic and randomized cake cutting mechanisms that are truthful and fair under different assumptions with respect to the valuation functions of the agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 77 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Fair division; Envy-freeness; Cake cutting; Maximum flows; Strategy-proofness; Mechanism design;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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