Room assignment-rent division: A market approach
AbstractA group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
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Other versions of this item:
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach," Game Theory and Information 0202003, EconWPA, revised 26 Sep 2002.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room assignment-rent division: A market approach," Discussion Papers 0102-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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