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Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

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  • Azacis, Helmuts

    ()
    (Cardiff Business School)

Abstract

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2005/10.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behaviour , 62(1), pp. 140-154, January 2008.
Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2005/10

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Keywords: Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium;

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References

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  1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Room assignment-rent division: A market approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 515-538, 06.
  2. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
  3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Matthias G. Raith & Francis Su, 2000. "Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair Division Problems," Claremont Colleges Working Papers, Claremont Colleges 2000-47, Claremont Colleges.
  4. Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1999. "Competitive Fair Division," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 99-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  5. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
  6. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  7. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
  8. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Andersson, Tommy, 0. "Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society.
  2. Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012. "Let them cheat!," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
  3. Carmen Bevié, 2009. "Manipulation Games in Economics with Indivisible Goods," Working Papers 371, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

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