This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Claus-Jochen Haake () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, P.O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany)
Matthias G. Raith () (Department of Economics, University of Magdeburg, P.O. Box 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, Germany)
Francis Edward Su () (Department of Mathematics, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711, USA)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments, assuming that players have quasi-linear utility functions. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made, and in what order. Moreover, it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We formally characterize the properties of the procedure, show how it establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources, and demonstrate its application to a wide class of fair-division problems.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/2019004/20190723.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 723-749
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:723-749

Note: Received: 6 March 2000/Accepted: 21 May 2001
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Francis Su, . "Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-10, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 418-443, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Flip Klijn, 2000. "An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 201-215. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Azacis, Helmuts, 2005. "Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2005/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Richard Hule & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 25-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Daniela Ambrosino & Vito Fragnelli & Maria Marina, 2006. "Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 625-643, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Paradoxes of Fair Division," Working Papers 00-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2009. "Solving House Allocation Problems with Risk-Averse Agents," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 389-401, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vito Fragnelli & Maria Erminia Marina, 2009. "Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(2), pages 143-153, July. [Downloadable!]
  7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room assignment-rent division: A market approach," Discussion Papers 0102-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 2700 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.