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No-envy and Arrow's conditions

Author

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  • Vincenzo DenicolÔ

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, UniversitÁ di Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40125 Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the concept of envy-freeness in the framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We define various no-envy conditions and study their relationships with Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. We also propose a new condition, called Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the conditional power to veto at least one social state (for instance, a social state which is particularly unfair to him). We show that, under unrestricted domain, Pareto Optimality and a weak independence condition, Minimal Equity leads to an impossibility result.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo DenicolÔ, 1999. "No-envy and Arrow's conditions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 585-597.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:585-597
    Note: Received: 9 October 1997/Accepted: 27 May 1998
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2018. "Choice functions and weak Nash axioms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 159-176, December.
    3. Norihito Sakamoto, 2013. "No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1033-1045, April.

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