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Envy-free and efficient allocations in large public good economies

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  • Diamantaras, Dimitrios

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  • Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1991. "Envy-free and efficient allocations in large public good economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 227-232, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:36:y:1991:i:3:p:227-232
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1990. "The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521388702.
    2. Varian, Hal R., 1976. "Two problems in the theory of fairness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 249-260.
    3. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
    4. Kleinberg, Norman L., 1980. "Fair allocations and equal incomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 189-200, October.
    5. Greenberg, Joseph, 1977. "Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 137-150, December.
    6. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1981. "Fair allocations in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 269-282, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    2. Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0603, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    3. Susumu Cato, 2020. "Compatibility of egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 97-103, April.
    4. Jose Aizpurua & Antonio Manresa, 1994. "A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 141-158, December.
    5. Maria Laura Pesce, 2011. "Are Asymmetrically Informed Agents Envious?," CSEF Working Papers 292, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

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