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Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods

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  • Greenberg, Joseph
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGG80-1S4/2/817932c56b50b0e8bc38d8c6280b28fe
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 16 (1977)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 137-150

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:16:y:1977:i:2:p:137-150

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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    Cited by:
    1. Klaus Desmet & Michel Breton & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín & Shlomo Weber, 2011. "The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 183-213, September.
    2. Klaus Desmet & Michel Le Breton & Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Shlomo Weber , 2008. "Stability of Nations and Genetic Diversity ," Working Papers 003-08, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
    3. Fan-chin Kung, 2013. "Public Good Coalitions and Membership Exclusion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1390-1395.
    4. Donald K. Richter, 1980. "Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria in a Local Public Goods Economy with Perfect Consumer Mobility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 547, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Fan-chin Kung, 2005. "Formation of Collective Decision-Making Units: Stability and a Solution," Game Theory and Information 0505002, EconWPA, revised 21 Jun 2005.
    6. Thomas. J. Nechyba, 1997. "Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 277-304.
    7. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1998. "The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibrium," Working Papers mwooders-98-06, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    8. Jose Aizpurua & Antonio Manresa, 1994. "A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 141-158, December.
    9. Hideo Konishi, 1996. "Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 43-50, January.
    10. Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1991. "Envy-free and efficient allocations in large public good economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 227-232, July.

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