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On fair allocations and monetary compensations

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  • Jorge Nieto

    (Departamento de EconomÎa, Universidad Pßblica de Navarra, E-31006 Pamplona, SPAIN)

  • IÓigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe

    (Departamento de EconomÎa Industrial, Universidad del PaÎs Vasco and Departamento de Fundamentos del AnÂlisis EconÕmico, Universidad de Alicante, E-03690 Alicante, SPAIN)

Abstract

In this paper we study fair division problems with the special feature that there exists only one transferable good that everyone likes. This good will be used to compensate some individuals for their differences in other non-transferable resources (like talents or handicaps). In this context we test the traditional no-envy solution and we verify that: 1) its ethical content can be a matter of discussion, and 2) frequently it does not select a non-empty set of allocations. We propose an extension of this criterion that partially solves the existence problem while also retaining the main ethical properties of the preceding solution.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 7 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 125-138

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1995:i:1:p:125-138

Note: Received: June 1, 1994; revised version December 19, 1994
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Cited by:
  1. Jorge Nieto Vazquez & Pedro Pascual Arzoz & Manuel Rapun Garate, 1998. "Distribucion, compensacion y fondos estructurales: una propuesta metodologica," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 9805, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  2. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004. "Rewarding effort," Memorandum 15/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  3. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
  4. Rebeca Echávarri & Iñaki Permanyer, 2008. "Ranking profiles of capability sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 521-535, October.
  5. Laurence Kranich, 2009. "Measuring opportunity inequality with monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 371-385, December.
  6. Marc Fleurbaey, 2006. "To Envy or to be Envied? Refinements of No-Envy fot the Compensation Problem," IDEP Working Papers 0603, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jul 2006.

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