On fair allocations and monetary compensations
AbstractIn this paper we study fair division problems with the special feature that there exists only one transferable good that everyone likes. This good will be used to compensate some individuals for their differences in other non-transferable resources (like talents or handicaps). In this context we test the traditional no-envy solution and we verify that: 1) its ethical content can be a matter of discussion, and 2) frequently it does not select a non-empty set of allocations. We propose an extension of this criterion that partially solves the existence problem while also retaining the main ethical properties of the preceding solution.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 7 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: June 1, 1994; revised version December 19, 1994
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O47 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2006. "To Envy or to be Envied? Refinements of No-Envy fot the Compensation Problem," IDEP Working Papers 0603, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jul 2006.
- Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004.
15/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Laurence Kranich, 2009. "Measuring opportunity inequality with monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 371-385, December.
- Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
- Rebeca Echávarri & Iñaki Permanyer, 2008. "Ranking profiles of capability sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 521-535, October.
- Jorge Nieto Vazquez & Pedro Pascual Arzoz & Manuel Rapun Garate, 1998. "Distribucion, compensacion y fondos estructurales: una propuesta metodologica," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra 9805, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.