In allocation problems of perfectly divisible goods, we study the equity property of 'no-domination', according to which no agent can receive strictly more of all goods than any other agent. We prove that no-domination is incompatible with Pareto efficiency, as soon as preferences are allowed to be non-convex.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number
426.
Length: 9 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:426
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Terry Fisher).
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)