A Strong Incompatibility Between Efficiency and Equity in Non-Convex Economics
AbstractIn allocation problems of perfectly divisible goods, we study the equity property of 'no-domination', according to which no agent can receive strictly more of all goods than any other agent. We prove that no-domination is incompatible with Pareto efficiency, as soon as preferences are allowed to be non-convex.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 426.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
ALLOCATION ; EQUITY ; ECONOMIC MODELS;
Other versions of this item:
- Maniquet, Francois, 1999. "A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 467-474, December.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- H. R. Varian, 1973.
"Equity, Envy and Efficiency,"
115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
- Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1975.
"Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity,"
174, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010.
"Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information,"
2010-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2012. "Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 413-423.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 813.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Geoffroy de Clippel & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 431, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2004.
"Two Criteria for Social Decisions,"
2004-W27, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Cato, Susumu, 2010. "Local strict envy-freeness in large economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 319-322, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriel Mihalache).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.