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Egalitarian-equivalent Groves Mechanisms in the Allocation of Heterogeneous Objects

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  • Duygu Yengin

    ()
    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an efficient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, first we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-deficit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian-equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy.

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File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2010-29.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-29.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-29

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Web page: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/
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Keywords: fairness; allocation of indivisible goods and money; task assignments; strategy-proofness; the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; order preservation;

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References

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  1. Duygu Yengin, 2010. "Welfare Bounds in a Growing Population," School of Economics Working Papers 2010-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  2. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  3. Porter, Ryan & Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Fair imposition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 209-228, October.
  4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  5. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  6. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  7. Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
  8. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  9. Duygu Yengin, 2010. "Equivalence of Resource/Opportunity Egalitarianism and Welfare Egalitarianism in Quasilinear Domains," School of Economics Working Papers 2010-01, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  10. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, 06.
  11. Shinji Ohseto, 2004. "Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 659-670, March.
  12. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
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Cited by:
  1. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-27, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  2. Conan Mukherjee, 2014. "Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 289-311, February.
  3. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2014. "Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 425-442, June.
  4. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-34, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  5. Duygu Yengin, 2012. "Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds," School of Economics Working Papers 2012-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  6. Itai Ashlagi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2012. "Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 531-542, March.

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