Equivalence of Resource/Opportunity Egalitarianism and Welfare Egalitarianism in Quasilinear Domains
AbstractWe study the allocation of indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We show that the only allocation mechanism (upto Pareto-indifference) that satisfies the axioms supporting resource and opportunity egalitarianism is the one that equalizes the welfares. We present alternative characterizations, and budget properties of this mechanism and discuss how it would ensure fair compensation in government requisitions and condemnations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-01.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
egalitarianism; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; allocation of indivisible goods and money; fair auctions; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness; population monotonicity; cost monotonicity; government requisitions; eminent domain;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-11 (All new papers)
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- Duygu Yengin, 2010.
"Egalitarian-equivalent Groves Mechanisms in the Allocation of Heterogeneous Objects,"
School of Economics Working Papers
2010-29, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- Duygu Yengin, 2012. "Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 137-160, January.
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