Equivalence of Resource/Opportunity Egalitarianism and Welfare Egalitarianism in Quasilinear Domains
AbstractWe study the allocation of indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We show that the only allocation mechanism (upto Pareto-indifference) that satisfies the axioms supporting resource and opportunity egalitarianism is the one that equalizes the welfares. We present alternative characterizations, and budget properties of this mechanism and discuss how it would ensure fair compensation in government requisitions and condemnations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-01.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
egalitarianism; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; allocation of indivisible goods and money; fair auctions; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness; population monotonicity; cost monotonicity; government requisitions; eminent domain;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-11 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Duygu Yengin, 2012.
"Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 137-160, January.
- Duygu Yengin, 2010. "Egalitarian-equivalent Groves Mechanisms in the Allocation of Heterogeneous Objects," School of Economics Working Papers 2010-29, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitriy Kvasov).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.