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A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems

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  • Yu Zhou
  • Youngsub Chun
  • Shigehiro Serizawa

Abstract

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the Vickrey rule in terms of the three properties in Holmstrom (1979) cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on the quasi-linear single-peaked domain, the Vickrey rule is still the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021. "A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems," ISER Discussion Paper 1120, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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