Reordering an existing queue
AbstractWe investigate the problem of reordering agents starting from an existing queue. First, we introduce four important axioms of the problem, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR). Unfortunately, it is easy to show that these four axioms are incompatible in the current setup. Given this negative result, we examine the consequences of relaxing BB, OE and SP, one at a time. Our results are as follows: (i) There is no mechanism satisfying OE, SP and IR which runs a nonnegative surplus at all profiles. (ii) When there are two agents, the only non-trivial mechanisms satisfying BB, SP and IR are Fixed price trading mechanisms but there are additional mechanisms when there are more than two agents. We identify an intuitive mechanism which we call the median price exchange mechanism and characterize its maximal level of inefficiency. (iii) By weakening SP to `one-sided' strategyproofness, we identify two mechanisms, the buyers' mechanism and the sellers' mech- anism, and characterize them on the basis of independence axioms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 13/15.
Date of creation: Jul 2013
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-08-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-08-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-TRE-2013-08-05 (Transport Economics)
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