Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems
AbstractWe study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in an hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 15 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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Other versions of this item:
- Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-27, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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